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ABSTRACT 
Modern network traffic classification puts much attention toward producing a granular classification of the traffic, such as at the application 
service level. However, the classification process is often impaired by the lack of granular network traffic ground truth. Granular network 
traffic ground truth is critical to provide a benchmark for a fair evaluation of modern network traffic classification. Nevertheless, in modern 
network traffic classification, existing ground truth tools only managed to build the ground truth at the application name level at most. 
Application name level granularity is quickly becoming insufficient to address the current needs of network traffic classification and 
therefore; this paper presents the design, development and experimental evaluation of Grano-GT, a tool to build a reliable and highly granular 
network traffic ground truth for encrypted browser-based traffic at the application name and service levels. Grano-GT builds on four main 
engines which are packet capture, browser, application and service isolator engines. These engines work together to intercept the application 
requests and combine them with the support of temporal features and cascading filters to produce reliable and highly granular ground truth. 
Preliminary experimental results show that Grano-GT can classify the Internet traffic into respective application names with high reliability. 
Grano-GT achieved an average accuracy of more than 95% when validated using nDPI at the application name level. The remaining 5% loss 
of accuracy was primarily due to the unavailability of signatures in nDPI. In addition, Grano-GT managed to classify application service 
traffic with significant reliability and validated using the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 Network traffic classification is a fundamental process that has a wide implementation in various domains [1]. For example, traffic 
classification is important for network administrators to analyze the type of traffic in their networks, such as HTTP or mail traffic. It helps 
network administrators to optimize and prioritize their network resources based on the type of traffic classified. Besides optimizing network 
resources, traffic classification is also critical for network security. Network security benefits from traffic classification by having the ability 
to apply security policies on targeted traffic. However, in order to evaluate the accuracy of a network traffic classification model, we need a 
reliable network traffic ground truth. The evaluation process using the network traffic ground truth is critical to justify the performance of a 
proposed technique. There are a few existing tools that can build network traffic ground truth such as Traffic Labeller [2]  and GT [3]. Despite 
that, the tools provide a rather limited level of classification granularity such as at the application protocol (e.g., HTTP and FTP) and 
application category levels (e.g., P2P and Mail). In modern networks, there is a demand for higher classification granularity than this sort of 
high-level protocol or category. Higher classification granularity such as at the application name and service level is highly valuable in 
modern networks. Most applications in modern networks offer various user interactions such as posting comments, liking a photo or streaming 
a video. Hence, the ability to classify traffic at these levels allows network administrators to be more precise when applying their network 
policies. Generally, we can divide the classification granularity into the 3 categories, a) coarse-grained,  b) fine-grained and c) binary as 





Figure 1: Classification granularity 
 
 The coarse-grained category includes application protocol (e.g., HTTP, SSH, SMTP) and type (e.g., Video, Multimedia, Games) which 
only provide a high-level classification. It is useful for lightweight use cases such as the traditional packet filtering firewall. On the other 
hand, fine-grained category classifies at application name (e.g. Facebook, Twitter) and service (e.g., Facebook-chat, Twitter-post) which 
gives more visibility into the network. For instance, Palo Alto’s Next-Generation Firewall can classify traffic down to its application service 
level (e.g. Facebook-chat, Facebook-Audio) by using signature-based techniques [4]. Finally, another category of granularity is the binary 
category. The binary category focuses on differentiating one major traffic class from another or one-versus-one as we defined it in this paper. 
For example, [5] distinguished between encrypted and non-encrypted traffic while [6] applied the same classification granularity by 
discriminating malicious traffic from non-malicious traffic. The various levels of granularity also map to diverse classification techniques 
using port, deep packet inspection (DPI), statistical, machine learning and behavioral-based. Despite that, there exist several critical problems 
when validating classification techniques. 
  
 Among the problems when validating classification techniques is the lack of reliable and highly granular network traffic ground truth. 
Most network traffic traces such as from [7] and [8] only managed to build the ground truth down to the application name level at most. 
Therefore, it is challenging to validate the performance of classification techniques without proper ground truth which is publicly available. 
Consequently, researchers tend to validate their techniques using private ground truth. Using private ground truth for validation leads to 
another problem which is that the reliability of the technique used to collect the private ground truth is often arguable. Some of the common 
techniques used are port-based, DPI or manual classification. Manual classification takes place in a controlled lab environment. For example, 
[9] generated their ground truth by running the target application in an isolated machine. Although this approach can potentially provide the 
ground truth, we need to acknowledge that there is also background traffic running on the machine such as by daemons. Hence, it can 
contaminate the ground truth traffic thus decreasing its reliability. As a workaround, it is a common approach to apply DPI on the captured 
traffic. DPI operates by inspecting packet payloads to find a match of predefined signature strings. For example, HTTP traffic is easily 
identifiable by the signature string in its methods like GET and POST. However, DPI is less effective when dealing with encrypted traffic 
and applications having similar traffic signatures. 
 
 Therefore, this paper introduces Grano-GT which is a ground truth collection tool that aims to collect reliable and highly granular 
ground truth for encrypted browser-based traffic at the application name and service level. There are four main engines that power Grano-
GT which are packet capture, browser, application and service isolator engines. These engines take advantage of Python and the Chrome 
DevTools Protocol [10] to isolate traffic coming from a target tab in the Chrome browser. By using this approach, Grano-GT can reliably 
label the application name without any contamination from background traffic. In addition, Grano-GT inspects the application layer header 
inside the Chrome environment for unique signatures and passes the signatures to a series of cascading filters to discriminate the application 
into its services. Grano-GT intelligently takes advantage of time-related features to effectively complement the process of segregating the 
traffic into its application services in the event of traffic encryption.  
 
 The ability to address encrypted traffic for network traffic ground truth collection demonstrates the reliability of our work. To 
demonstrate the reliability of Grano-GT, we evaluate it in two network environments; a) a wired campus network: UM-Net and b) a wireless 
home network: HOME-Net. Our experiments show that Grano-GT achieves optimum reliability at the application-name level due to the 
ability to intercept and isolate the IP addresses used during the browsing session. As a result, we eliminate the existence of background traffic 
belonging to other unrelated applications regardless of the encryption state of the traffic. Therefore, Grano-GT removes any possible 
contamination in the traffic capture, which was one of the problems highlighted in earlier works. We validate our claim by using nDPI which 
is a well-known DPI engine [11] and achieve 95% average accuracy mainly due to the unavailability of signatures in nDPI. Grano-GT 




strengthen our finding at the application service level, we take advantage of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test to validate the distinction between 
the packet size distributions of different application services. The Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test is a statistical test to verify whether a sample 
belongs to a reference probability distribution. We adopt the Kolmogorov Smirnov Test due to its ability to ingest our packet size distribution 
values and conclude whether they are from the same application service. Our application of the Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test is similar to 
studies done by [12] and [13] in the Physics and Big Data domains. As a summary, the contributions of this paper are as follows: 
 
a) A new approach and design for a ground truth collection tool called Grano-GT to collect reliable and highly granular network 
traffic ground truth for encrypted browser-based traffic at the application name and service levels. 
b) A technique using IP address isolation to achieve the most optimum collection reliability at the application name level. 
c) An approach using time-related features to complement the traffic segregation process at the application service level to remove 
the dependency on packet payload inspection, thus addressing the issue of traffic encryption and privacy concerns. 
 
 We organize the remainder of the paper as follows. Section 2 discusses the related work in the domain. We present the architecture of 
Grano-GT in Section 3 and provide comprehensive interpretations for each component of the architecture. Section 4 outlines our experimental 
setup and in Section 5, we present the experimental analysis of this paper which includes elaborating on the evaluation and validation 
processes of our experiments. In Section 6, we discuss key issues in the domain and the ways to move forward. Finally, Section 7 concludes 
the paper. 
 
2.  RELATED WORK 
 Reliable ground truth for network traffic classification remains as an open problem in the research community [14, 15]. It hinders 
proper comparison and validation between the proposed solutions. This is because most solutions utilized a private ground truth dataset for 
validation [16]. These private ground truths are commonly collected and labelled using less reliable techniques as described in the previous 
section such as port-based, DPI or manual isolation as shown in Figure 2.  
 
 
Figure 2 Ground truth techniques 
  
 Port-based is the most straightforward approach to acquire ground truth. It matches the port number of the targeted traffic against the 
list of registered port numbers of standard applications and protocols as published by the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) [17]. 
For example, network traffic destined for port 80 matches the HTTP tag as described by IANA. However, considering the current dynamic 
port allocations and obfuscation technique [18], port-based is quickly becoming obsolete if used as a standalone technique. This is because 
modern applications tend to move away from using standard and well-known port numbers. A study by [19] proved that using the port-based 
as a standalone technique only achieved 70% accuracy at most. As a result of the low accuracy, researchers often reserve the port-based 
technique as a last resort such as during the event of unavailability of the payload information. For instance, [20] and [21] utilized the port-
based technique to create their ground truths due to such an event. [20] assumed in their work that the port-based technique was largely 
accurate because their dataset was collected before the widespread use of dynamic port numbers. 
 
 In order to address the issue of dynamic port numbers, it is relatively common to use DPI to label the ground truth. DPI inspects the 
packet payload for unique application string signatures. An application string signature may be in the form of common strings such as the 
HTTP methods (e.g. GET and POST) that can uniquely identify an application. Due to the ability to inspect down to the packet payload, DPI 
emerges as a popular technique to create ground truth. [22] developed a DPI tool to match regular expression patterns against the packet 
payload. In [16], the authors compared the performance of multiple DPI tools and concluded that nDPI [11] and Libprotoident [23] as the 
most reliable open source DPI. As an example, [24] utilized nDPI to label the ground truth dataset. However, the effectiveness of DPI starts 
to diminish with encrypted traffic. Besides that, DPI requires frequent updates to the signature library to keep up with new applications. [25] 
proved this issue in their work when they were unable to label the ground truth of packets coming from new applications in one of their 
datasets. Hence, coupling the ineffectiveness of DPI on encrypted traffic together with the inconsistent performance among different DPI 




 As an alternative technique to combat the decreasing reliability of DPI, researchers consider the possibility of manually isolating the 
traffic. Manual isolation involves preparing machines (e.g., personal computers, virtual machines) with exclusive access only to the target 
application. This technique carries the assumption that all traffic captured through the machine belongs to the target application. [9] and [26] 
created the ground truth by manually isolating the application traffic. [9] used Docker as a virtual container to sterilize the network capture 
environment. Despite that, it is also worth noting that there still exists some background traffic such as from the system daemons in the 
machine that might contaminate the captured ground truth [3].  
 
 To lower the risk of contaminating the ground truth with background traffic, researchers introduced agent-based ground truth collection. 
The agents monitor the socket calls on the client machine. Sockets are endpoints in a communication flow between two applications running 
over a network. Therefore, monitoring the socket calls allows the extraction and association of the information on the running application 
process with the captured traffic thus producing accurate ground truths. For example, [8] introduced MIRAGE which tags mobile traffic with 
its process information through socket monitoring. Meanwhile, [3] proposed a tool named GT, which also tracks the socket activities and 
tags the traffic based on the information gathered from the sockets. Using this technique, GT managed to label the ground truth down to its 
application name (e.g., Safari, Apple Mail). A tool named Flowsing further improved GT by having the ability to label ground truth at 
multiple levels (i.e., application type and name) [27]. On the other hand, [2] proposed Traffic Labeller (TL) that captures all user socket calls 
and corresponding application process information. Then, TL tags the traffic by inserting application information into the TOS field of 
matching IP packets. Although it ensures high accuracy, it modifies the size of the IP packet, thus risking inaccurate capture.  
 
 As a countermeasure to inaccurate capture problems, there are also hybrid techniques that provide multiple layers of classification 
mechanism to increase the reliability of the network traffic ground truth. [28] introduced the Ground Truth Verification System (GTVS) 
which is a multi-layered hybrid framework to build ground truth datasets. It combines multiple techniques in the form of heuristics rules such 
as DPI and port-based classification. GTVS runs the heuristics rules in five iterations, with each iteration focusing on the remaining 
unclassified network traffic flow. The final iteration of GTVS involves manual human inspection to label the ground truth. Although GTVS 
managed to increase the reliability of the ground truth, it is not fully automated thus presenting some concerns on the scalability of the tool.  
 
 Table 1 lists the advantages and disadvantages of existing ground truth techniques while Table 2 summarizes the ground truth tools 
discussed in this section. All the tools offer different advantages over one another. However, they share the same limitation where the 
classification granularity is limited to the application name (i.e., Safari, Apple Mail). While application name granularity may have been 
more than sufficient in the past, [29] mentioned the need for a more granular classification, particularly at the application service level (i.e., 
Facebook-chat, Skype-voice) in modern networks. Besides that, existing tools put little attention to encrypted traffic because majority of the 
tools only deal with lower granularity levels and utilize socket monitoring through agent-based technique. Socket monitoring ignores the 
content of the packet hence is unaffected by the encryption state. Therefore, socket monitoring is less effective in collecting highly granular 
ground truth such as at the application service level as proposed by this paper. 
 
 As such, considering the current limitations of existing tools, this paper aims to pioneer the effort to build a reliable and highly granular 
ground truth collection tool for encrypted browser-based traffic at the application name and service levels through Grano-GT.  
 
Table 1 Advantages and disadvantages of existing ground truth techniques 
Technique Advantages Disadvantages 
Port-based 
A simple and straightforward technique by 
comparing the port number against a list of 
predefined port numbers by IANA. 
Dynamic port allocation drives down the accuracy of 
this technique as applications move away from 
standard port assignments. 
DPI 
A very accurate technique by inspecting the contents 
of the network packet for matching signature strings. 
Traffic encryption diminishes the effectiveness of 
DPI as it is unable to inspect the encrypted packet 
contents. 
Manual isolation 
The technique is easily set up by running 
applications in an isolated machine and network 
environment. 
There is still a possibility for a contaminated traffic 
capture from the background daemon traffic. 
Agent-based 
A highly accurate and reliable technique by using 
agents to monitor network socket activities. 
The classification granularity is limited to 
application name level at most as application service 
traffic rarely spawns unique socket activities. 
Hybrid 
Increases reliability of network traffic ground truth 
by using multiple levels of classification. 
It involves manual human effort thus reduces the 





3.  GRANO-GT ARCHITECTURE 
 The architecture of Grano-GT operates to build a reliable and highly granular network traffic ground truth. It sources the ground truth 
from live network traffic coming from a Google Chrome browser. The live network traffic goes through a series of processing engines before 
producing a collection of network traffic ground truth at the application name and service levels as the final output. Grano-GT works with 




Figure 3: Grano-GT architecture 
 
 Figure 3 shows the architecture of Grano-GT, which builds on four main elements: a browser isolator engine which utilizes Chrome 
DevTools Protocol and PyChrome to isolate network responses from a target tab; a packet capture engine running on tshark [30], which is 
the command-line version of Wireshark to capture all network traffic simultaneously; an application isolator engine built on Python which 
filters only the specific target application traffic; and a service isolator engine to separate the target application service from the entire 
application traffic.  The distinct components of the approach, and the main contributing technologies, are discussed in the sub-sections that 
follow 
 
3.1 Browser Isolator Engine 
 The browser isolator engine runs on two main tools which are the Chrome Devtools Protocol and PyChrome. These tools ensure that 
the engine can effectively isolate the application traffic and remove all unrelated traffic from the capture. 
 
3.1.1 Chrome Devtools Protocol 
 One of the main challenges of building a highly granular ground truth is distinguishing the raw traffic at the application service level. 
Application service traffic rarely spins up an entirely new network socket or uses a unique IP address that allows more straightforward 
Table 2 Summary of existing ground truth tools 
Tool Name Technique Granularity level Application type Performance 
MIRAGE [8] Agent-based Application name Mobile applications Not mentioned 




Able to tag up to 99% of 
the bytes and 95% of the 
flows 
Flowsing [27] Agent-based 
Application type and 
name 
Desktop applications 
Able to classify traffic into 
three different aggregation 
levels 
Traffic Labeller [2] Agent-based Application type Desktop applications 
100% accuracy using port-
based validation 
GTVS [28] Hybrid Application type Desktop applications 
Outperformed L7-filter in 




classification if compared to the application name traffic which sits at a lower granularity level. Therefore, we tackle this problem by 
intercepting the traffic in the browser itself which gives visibility to all browser interactions. Additionally, we selected Google Chrome as it 
is the most popular browser with a 67% market share according to a recent study [31]. Google Chrome also comes with the Chrome Devtools 
Protocol (CDP). CDP is unlike a typical network protocol (e.g. TCP). Instead, it is a set of tools or interface functions that allow rapid 
debugging of Chromium, Chrome and other Blink-based browsers programmatically [10]. CDP maintains a publicly available set of API. 
The API covers various domains such as performance, browser and network. Grano-GT mainly takes advantage of the browser and network 
API to profile the network activity from a specific target tab accurately. 
 
3.1.2 PyChrome 
 Grano-GT builds on Python programming language. It is helpful to have a Python driver for CDP to simplify its implementation. Hence, 
Grano-GT utilizes PyChrome which is a Python driver for CDP [32]. It is an open-source driver that allows developers to access CDP’s API 
using Python. For example, in this paper, PyChrome is responsible for executing all browser-based tasks such as launching the target 
application and intercepting network events through callback functions.  
 
 
Figure 4 Workflow of browser isolator engine 
 
 Another challenge of collecting network traffic ground truth is the existence of background traffic that can contaminate the capture. To 
remove the risk of contamination, we separate the network responses from a specific browser tab using the API from CDP through the 
browser isolator engine. The browser isolator engine: 1) spawns a new tab in the Chrome browser. 2) launches a request to the target 
application in the new tab. These two processes make use of PyChrome to achieve the objectives programmatically. 
  
 As shown in Figure 4, the engine implements a callback function that triggers on Network.responseReceived event. In other words, the 
callback function executes when it receives response packets from the application server. Then, it inspects all the packet headers and logs the 
remote IP addresses. Consequently, it produces a list of IP addresses purely from the application running on the target tab. This is critical 
because modern applications typically serve their resources from multiple IP addresses. 
 
 Besides that, the browser isolator engine is also responsible for detecting the target application service. It implements a callback 
function that triggers on Network.requestWillBeSent event. The callback function inspects the request header and searches for matching 
signatures for the target application service. If there is a matching signature, the engine logs the epoch time of the match for further processing 
in the service isolator engine later on. It is also worth noting that the signatures used in Grano-GT is only limited to request headers (e.g. 
request URL) and is independent of the packet payload content.  
 
3.2 Packet Capture Engine 
 The packet capture engine sits at the core of Grano-GT as it functions to capture the network traffic during the session. There are 
various packet capture tools available such as tcpdump and Wireshark. Grano-GT mainly utilizes the command-line version of Wireshark, 
called tshark [30]. Tshark retains all the advantages of Wireshark while providing a more effective platform for customizing the output 
programmatically. In Grano-GT, tshark serves as the network traffic capture tool to dump all the network traffic during a user’s browsing 
session. 
 
 Tshark runs simultaneously alongside the browser isolator engine using Python’s subprocess module. During the live capture, tshark 
immediately applies a filter to capture only the network traffic originating and destined to the user’s machine IP address. The filter ensures 
that it captures all network traffic intended for the user’s machine regardless of whether it is from the target application or other applications 




3.3 Application Isolator Engine 
 Network traffic captured through the packet capture engine consist of traffic from all applications intended for the user’s machine. 
There is a need to extract only the traffic of the target application for further processing. To extract the traffic of the target application, we 
recall the IP log file generated from the browser isolator engine earlier as well as the captured traffic dump as inputs for the application 
isolator engine. 
 
Algorithm 1: Application isolator engine 
 Input: captured_traffic, CT and IP_log_file, Set(IP_log) 
 Output: application_traffic.pcap 
  
1: for packet in CT: 
2:     if packet.ip.source in IP_log or packet.ip.dest in IP_log: 
3:         write(packet, application_traffic.pcap) 
4:     end if 
5: end for 
6: return application_traffic.pcap 
 
 Algorithm 1 explains the process in further detail. The application isolator engine traverses each packet in the captured traffic. It 
verifies if the source or destination IP address matches any of the IP addresses in the IP log file. If the IP matches, it writes the packet into a 
new file named application_traffic.pcap. The write function is a self-written utility function that is based on the PcapWriter class from the 
Scapy library. The output of Algorithm 1 is a sanitized file containing only the target application traffic. 
 
3.4 Service Isolator Engine 
 The sanitized application traffic contains the entire traffic from the target application. However, we are only interested in the traffic of 
the target application service. In order to extract the service, the service isolator engine implements a series of cascading filters. There are 
three levels of filtering throughout the segregation process: L1, L2 and L3 service filters. 
 
 L1 service filter aims to extract the target application service by using the service_log epoch time from the browser isolator engine. 
The epoch time signifies the exact time that the user executed the target application service. As such, the L1 service filter extracts all packets 
having epoch time more than the time recorded in the service_log, as shown in Algorithm 2. Using this method, the L1 service filter eliminates 
the unrelated packets arriving before the target application service execution. 
 
Algorithm 2: L1 service filter 
 Input: application_traffic, AT and service_log, SL 
 Output: service_traffic, time_delta 
  
1: epoch = SL.epoch 
2: time_delta = list() 
3: for packet in AT: 
4:     if packet.time_epoch > epoch: 
5:         write(packet, service_traffic) 
6:         time_delta.append(packet.time_delta_displayed) 
7:     end if 
8: end for 
9: return  service_traffic, time_delta 
  
 Although the L1 service filter can extract the target application service traffic, there is still a high chance that the traffic contains other 
unrelated packets that arrived after the epoch time recorded in service_log. Therefore, the L2 service filter classifies the traffic further in 
order to increase precision. The process classifies the application service traffic by using the standard deviation of interarrival times as the 
segregation factor. Equation 1 shows the formula for the standard deviation used in this paper. 




+ 𝜖  (1) 
 
where 𝛿𝑡𝑖 = element in the time_delta list from L1 service filter, 
 
 
𝜇 = mean of time_delta, 
N = length of time_delta, 
𝜖 = compensating value for time_delta 
 
Algorithm 3: L2 service filter 
 Input: service_traffic, ST and time_delta, TD 
 Output: Multiple PCAP files 
  
1:  = 0.05 
2: interarrival_std = std(time_delta) +  
3: cnt = 1 
4: while True: 
5:     packet = ST.load_packet() 
6:     while packet.time_delta_displayed < interarrival_std: 
7:         write(packet, service_traffic_cnt) 
8:         packet = ST.load_packet() 
9:     end while 
10:     cnt = cnt + 1 
11: end while 
12: return  service_traffic_cnt 
 
 Based on our study, application service traffic occurs in a burst that is recognizable within the standard deviation of its interarrival 
times. This is also in line with a recent study that identified application traffic through its burstiness [33]. However, it is also worth noting 
that there is a micro delay between exact service execution and packet capture time. Therefore, we introduced the value 𝝐, epsilon, which is 
an arbitrary small subsecond value to compensate for the delay. We selected the epsilon value of 0.05 as shown in Algorithm 3 after cross-
validating the value against a set of values, namely 0.010, 0.025, 0.1, 0.125 and 0.15. Algorithm 3 also shows how it classifies the service 
traffic from the L1 service filter into multiple PCAP files. Each PCAP file consists of packets that are within the standard deviation threshold. 
 
Algorithm 4: L3 service filter 
 Input: Multiple PCAP files and signature, S, and interarrival 
standard deviation, interarrival_std 
 Output: Pure application service PCAP files 
  
1: for each PCAP file, f: 
2:     keyword_cnt = 0 
3:     for packet in f: 
4:         time_diff = packet.time_epoch - epoch 
5:         if S in packet.header or time_diff < interarrival_std: 
6:             keyword_cnt = keyword_cnt + 1 
7:             break 
8:         end if 
9:     end for 
10:     if keyword_cnt == 0: 
11:         remove(f) 
12:     else: 
13:         return f 
  
 Lastly, each of the PCAP files from the L2 service filter goes through the final stage of filtering which is the L3 service filter shown in 
Algorithm 4. The L3 service filter narrows down the segregation and checks each of the PCAP files for matching signatures. In the event of 
traffic encryption or none of the signature matches, the filter checks if the difference between the packet arrival time and the logged 
application service time is lower than the standard deviation of interarrival times. If none of the conditions matches, the filter drops the PCAP 
file, assuming that it is unrelated to the target application service. The final output of the L3 service filter is a collection of PCAP files purely 
of the target application service. In addition, the use of time-related features allows Grano-GT to operate in both unencrypted and encrypted 





Table 3 Summary of service filters 
Service filter Objective Output 
L1 
Extract related target 
application traffic starting 








Partition the target 
application traffic into 
multiple smaller PCAP 
files containing possible 
target application service 
traffic. 
Multiple PCAP files 
containing traffic 
partitioned from L1. 
L3 
Remove unrelated traffic 
from L2 and return only 
the target application 
service traffic. 




4.  TESTBED SETUP 
 We evaluated Grano-GT on two network environments: UM-Net which is a wired campus network at Universiti Malaya (UM) in Kuala 
Lumpur, Malaysia and HOME-Net which is a wireless home network provided by Telekom Malaysia, also in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia 
between November 2019 to April 2020. Using two distinct network environments provides a better evaluation of the robustness of Grano-
GT on different network settings.   
 
 At UM, we ran Grano-GT on a 3.4 GHz quad-core machine running Windows 10. We ran the tool and collected a total of 56 GB of 
network ground truth traffic for ten common and popular browser-based applications in our region [34-36]. On the other hand, we ran Grano-
GT in a wireless home network to diversify the network conditions. We utilized a mid-range 2.0 GHz quad-core machine and collected a 
total of 36 GB of ground truth traffic for the same number of applications. Table 4 shows the complete list of applications involved in this 
paper. It shows the application name such as Facebook and its corresponding category which is Social Media for easier reference. In addition, 
Table 4 also lists the related application services for each respective application. Besides that, the Total Bytes column indicates the total size 
in bytes of the captured traffic for each application name and service in both network environments, UM-Net and HOME-Net. We accessed 





5.  EXPERIMENTAL ANALYSIS 
 We conducted two sets of experiments to evaluate Grano-GT. The first set of experiments aims to evaluate the reliability of our traffic 
traces at the application name level, such as Facebook and Twitter. Although we are confident that our traffic traces are highly reliable at the 
application name level due to the nature of Algorithm 1 described previously, we ran our traffic traces through nDPI which served as the DPI 
engine to provide further validation. We chose nDPI because it can be seen as the defacto standard of DPI based on its performance described 
in [16].  However, nDPI only works on a finite list of application names and put less coverage on the majority of application services. 
Therefore, nDPI fails to recognize the application services in this paper. 
  
 Hence, our second set of experiments looks into how statistical testing can act as an alternative technique and verify the consistency of 
traffic traces at the application service level. As far as we are concerned, we are among the pioneer works that attempt to provide ground 
truth at the application service level which explains the lack of techniques for validation at this granularity level. For example, authors of 
MIRAGE created the ground truth for mobile application traffic, but put very little attention to the validation process of their ground truths 
[8]. Similarly, authors of Traffic Labeller used only the port-based method which is known to be highly restrictive to validate their ground 
truths [2]. 
 
5.1 VALIDATING THE APPLICATION NAME RELIABILITY USING NDPI 
 The algorithm running at the core of the application isolator engine ensures that Grano-GT produces a reliable ground truth at the 
application level. This is because the application isolator engine logs all the IP addresses coming from the target application server thus 
guaranteeing the extraction of pure traffic traces at the application name level. In this experiment, we validated the reliability of the traffic 
traces further by running them through nDPI and compared the results. 
 
Table 4 Complete list of applications 
Application name Application category 
Total Bytes Application 
service 
Total Bytes 
UM-Net HOME-Net UM-Net HOME-Net 
Facebook Social media 308593461 265613399 
comment 724882 200872 
post 1753208 219833 
react 14148 211124 
receive 697369 11226681 
send 232276 227342 
stream 239856017 7023755 
Youtube Video streaming 89032398 182437673 
comment 7461 1475863 
react 10977588 9127 
stream 13727747 21328426 
Twitter Social media 400246136 377565909 
tweet 60959014 448088 
retweet 4883487 3008042 
like 11018017 1016249 
Spotify Music streaming 7925388 21417369 
view 50213 748038 
react 9595 313938 
stream 3877304 5825032 
Web-Whatsapp Instant messaging 20283379 18295343 
send 3904 8604 
send-document 233149 3672268 
send-image 630462 1258854 
Medium Online articles 56968024 53287806 
read 1548183 5259445 
react 288752 3895247 
Lazada E-commerce 91392976 173227857 
view 45502056 4986109 
buy 2488849 1238459 
react 5087580 2104486 
Shopee E-commerce 49595474 65065681 
view 4125964 1625425 
buy 2154626 209157 
react 4317924 204972 
Reddit Online forum 46048171 98659909 
read 536632 491146 
react 61310 919485 
comment 18526 55008 
Netflix Video streaming 783922987 285698311 
react 133953416 6290817 




 We compiled and set up nDPI (version 3.3.0-2232-942a71c7) on a Linux machine running Ubuntu 18.04 LTS before creating a script 
to pass traffic traces from all applications through nDPI. nDPI is an open-source DPI engine that detects various protocols and application 
names from traffic traces using multiple approaches such as payload based signatures, IP address blocks and host-based matching. Table 5 
shows the bytes accuracies of nDPI calculated using Equation 2 for five application names. 
 
𝐵𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑎𝑐𝑐𝑢𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑦 =  
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑐𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑙𝑦 𝑐𝑙𝑎𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑏𝑦 𝑛𝐷𝑃𝐼
𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝑏𝑦𝑡𝑒𝑠 𝑐𝑜𝑙𝑙𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑 𝑏𝑦 𝐺𝑟𝑎𝑛𝑜𝐺𝑇
 (2) 
 
Table 5 Bytes accuracy of application name based on nDPI 
Application name UM-Net HOME-Net 
Facebook 94.4% 91.1% 
Youtube 90.4% 1% 
Twitter 96.2% 98.2% 
Web-Whatsapp 100% 99.8% 
Netflix 97.6% 99.3% 
  
 We had to exclude five of our applications which are Spotify, Medium, Lazada, Shopee and Reddit because their bytes accuracies were 
at 0% due to unavailability or outdated signatures in nDPI. For instance, signatures for Lazada and Shopee are unavailable because they are 
online shopping sites which are more common in South-East Asian countries and less known globally. Similarly, nDPI has yet to put coverage 
on Medium and Reddit while Spotify’s signature is outdated. 
  
 Apart from outdated signatures, encrypted traffic also has an impact on the effectiveness of nDPI. nDPI labels encrypted traffic with 
its respective encryption protocols like TLS or utilizes other approaches, as mentioned previously. Based on Table 5, nDPI fails to achieve 
100% accuracy, mostly due to its inability to detect the encrypted portion of the traffic. On the other hand, Youtube recorded only 1% 
accuracy in HOME-Net because it changed to using UDP protocol entirely for its video streaming service very recently and nDPI has yet to 
capture that change. 
 
 Hence, we can observe that the traffic traces captured by Grano-GT are reliable at the application name level. It also shows that using 
a DPI engine alone for building the ground truth presents its disadvantages such as unavailable and outdated signatures. Grano-GT managed 
to overcome these disadvantages by introducing the application isolator engine. 
 
5.2 VERIFYING THE APPLICATION SERVICE USING THE KOLMOGOROV-SMIRNOV TEST 
 Validating the reliability of the application name is a straightforward process because there exist DPI tools that allow a particular 
benchmark for us to compare. However, the same process carries a slight problem when dealing with application service. Unlike nDPI which 
is commonly accepted as a benchmark, there is a severe lack of benchmarks for application service traces to compare. 
 
 To eliminate any research bias when using our ground truths, we need a technique that can compare our ground truths against some 
benchmark. We can perform a manual inspection of each packet to confirm the accuracy. The downside of manually inspecting each packet 
is that it is time-consuming and still introduces research bias. To tackle this problem, we look at the packet size distribution of the application 
service traffic. The findings in [37] showed that packets belonging to the same application protocol exhibit a similar profile in terms of packet 
size distribution.  Using the same principle, we infer that the size distribution of the same application service should display similarities which 
leads us to the alternative technique to evaluate our ground truth at the application service level, which is the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS) 
Test [38]. 
 
 The KS Test is a test for goodness of fit. It is a non-parametric and distribution-free test where it makes no assumption about the 
underlying distribution of data. It is useful in comparing whether a sample belongs to a reference probability distribution. Besides that, the 
KS Test has a two-sample variation where it can test whether two samples have the same distribution. 
  
 In essence, the KS Test calculates the maximum distance between the empirical distribution function of two samples. Equation 3 shows 
the definition of the empirical distribution function. 
 
𝐹(𝑡) =






 Then, it compares the calculated maximum distance to a critical value before deciding on whether to reject or accept the null hypothesis. 
The critical value is defined in the table of critical values as noted in [38] where for a significance level of 0.05, the critical value, D is defined 
as follows: 
 
𝐷𝑐𝑟𝑖𝑡,0.05 =  
1.358
√𝑛
  (4) 
 
 As such, the Two-sample KS Test is a practical technique to verify our traffic traces at the application service level. The intuition of 
this experiment is that traffic traces from the same type of application service should portray similar packet size distribution. In other words, 
the maximum distance calculated should be lower than the critical value. For example, we calculated the KS values for 465 samples of 
Reddit-react traffic traces. Of these, 387 samples, or 83% recorded KS values lower than the critical value which indicates that the samples 
have similar packet size distribution. In contrast, traffic traces from different application services, regardless of its application names, should 
reflect a noticeable difference in its distribution.  
 
 
Figure 5a Comparison of cumulative distribution function values of different services within the same application 
 
 To illustrate, based on Figure 5a, we can observe that traffic traces from the same application service (i.e., Facebook-comment) show 
a small difference between the values of their empirical distribution function. However, Facebook-comment traffic shows a significant 
contrast when compared to other services although from the same Facebook application. For example, Facebook-react and Facebook-video 
displayed the most substantial difference between the function values. Meanwhile, Facebook-comment and Facebook-post traffic exhibit 
smaller differences because the nature of the service (i.e., commenting and posting on Facebook) is somewhat similar. 
 
 
Figure 5b Comparison of cumulative distribution function values of similar services from different applications 
 
 On the other hand, Figure 5b shows a comparison of the function values between similar application services but from different 
applications. Intuitively, the graph of Reddit-react traffic displays a small difference between the function values as they represent the same 
type of application service. However, the function values of Reddit-react traffic are distinct when compared to the same service (i.e., react) 
from different applications. Although the KS Test only validates the goodness of fit instead of the absolute accuracy, which is of more interest, 
it reduces the risk of research bias by providing a technique to prove the distinction between traffic traces at the application service level. 
 
6.  DISCUSSION 
 
In this paper, we presented Grano-GT which is a tool to build highly granular network traffic ground truth. Network traffic ground truth is 
critical to ensure a fair evaluation of network traffic classifiers as well as setting a performance benchmark. There are very few publicly 
available tools to build the ground truth as mentioned earlier in this paper. In addition, the majority of these tools put little attention on 





Grano-GT attempts to address that issue by experimenting with collecting reliable and granular network traffic ground truth at the application 
name and service levels. However, since Grano-GT is among the pioneers in this area, there are a few fundamental issues and challenges that 
are worth noting. In this section, we discuss the current challenges and future works for guidance to researchers and interested parties. 
 
 6.1 Evaluating reliability at the application service level 
 One of the most crucial phases of any research works is evaluation. Evaluating the ground truth traffic at the application service level 
remains a challenge. This is because there is a severe lack of datasets at the application service level for benchmarking purposes. Hence, 
researchers need to come up with a reliable technique to evaluate the reliability of the traffic traces at the application service level. 
Nonetheless, researchers can consider a few existing techniques such as manual inspection by experts and DPI. 
 
 Manually inspecting the traffic traces will highly likely increase the chance of getting the correct evaluation. Even so, it is often the 
case that the manual inspection involves thousands of network packets, if not more. As a consequence, this technique becomes impractical 
as it takes a tremendous amount of time and effort. To overcome this issue, an automated technique like DPI is preferable. 
 
 DPI is widely used to evaluate the originating application of traffic traces. It compares the packet against a set of predefined signatures. 
It is highly accurate but presents one significant issue. The issue is that DPI requires constant updates to its signature bank. Moreover, 
application service signatures are unavailable in most DPI engines. For instance, in this paper, we are unable to use nDPI to evaluate the 
traffic traces at the application service level due to the unavailability of signatures. In the future, we should put more effort into creating 
signatures at the application service level to cope with the evolving trend of network traffic classification. 
 
6.2 Collecting reliable ground truth with encrypted traffic 
 According to the recent Google Transparency Report [39], more than 90% of the traffic across Google is now encrypted. Encryption 
has quickly become a necessity due to rising concerns over user privacy. As such, encrypting the traffic helps in hiding user data from the 
public eye. Although hiding user data is an excellent move to protect user privacy, it poses a challenge to collect the network traffic ground 
truth because the encryption diminishes the effectiveness of the signature matching process. There are a few solutions that researchers can 
consider to work around the issue of traffic encryption. 
 
 
Figure 6 Grano-GT's approach to collect reliable ground truth with encrypted traffic 
 
 One of the most commonly used approaches is to introduce multiple techniques to detect the traffic besides signature matching alone. 
For example, based on Figure 6, we observe that the traffic remains unencrypted within the Chrome browser environment. As Grano-GT 
utilizes CDP in the Chrome browser environment, Grano-GT can view the traffic without any encryption and log the exact execution time of 
the application service upon detecting a matching signature. However, once the traffic exits the Chrome environment, the traffic gets 
encrypted. Hence, Grano-GT implements two techniques which are decrypting the traffic using the secret keys or using time-based matching. 
Grano-GT logs the secret keys from Chrome during the browsing session. Then, it utilizes the feature in tshark to decrypt the SSL/TLS traffic 
using the logged secret keys. If the secret keys are unable to decrypt the traffic due to limitations such as the type of protocols or ciphers 
used, Grano-GT switches to time-based matching. Grano-GT compares the difference between packet arrival times and the logged application 
service time to identify the targeted traffic without tampering with user privacy. 
 
 On the other hand, commercial solutions such as the Palo Alto Next-Generation Firewall offers traffic decryption to solve the problem. 
The firewall acts as a man-in-the-middle and intercepts the SSL request. Then, it returns the copy of the signed server certificate to the client 
thus allowing it to decrypt the traffic between the client and the server. Although this can potentially be seen as a breach in user privacy, Palo 
Alto claims to re-encrypt the traffic before pushing it back into the network [40]. Therefore, researchers need to put more consideration on 
 
 
this issue because the portion of encrypted traffic will only keep on increasing in the future. The process of collecting network traffic ground 
truth should be able to maintain its reliability regardless of the state of encryption. 
 
6.3 Publishing ground truth data without compromising privacy 
 Network traffic ground truth datasets are highly valuable for analysis and research. They allow researchers to evaluate and benchmark 
the performance of their proposed techniques, yet publicly available network ground truth datasets are scarce. Among the available datasets 
are by the Canadian Institute for Cybersecurity [41], WAND Network Research Group [7] and University of Brescia [42]. Despite that, the 
datasets are relatively outdated, with most of them being more than five years old. 
 
 The scarcity of publicly available network traffic ground truth datasets is primarily due to privacy concerns. Network traffic traces 
contain sensitive user data that can compromise privacy. The magnitude of privacy leaks can be devastating. For example, attackers can 
rebuild the network topology by using traffic traces [43]. This critical information exposes the network infrastructure to adversarial attacks. 
Besides that, attackers can also infer host behavior from the traffic which increases the risk of attacks.  
  
 As a result, most researchers are unable to publish their datasets without going through some anonymization process. Anonymizing 
network traffic traces is the process of removing identifiable relationships between two endpoints while ensuring data availability [44]. 
Authors in [44] presented a brief review of the typical traffic anonymity methods. For example, we can replace the IP addresses in the traffic 
traces with synthetic values. Besides that, we can also encrypt the IP address prefix [45]. There are also other common fields of a network 
packet that can undergo anonymization such as the MAC address, port number and timestamp. 
  
 Therefore, researchers should take all possible measures and considerations before releasing their datasets for public use. Future 
network traffic classification research may even consider moving the classification models to the traffic traces to overcome the need to make 
the data publicly available. As an example, Kaggle which is an online community for data scientists and machine learning practitioners [46], 
allows its participants to upload their machine learning models to a privately hosted data repository in a competition. As a result, participants 
in Kaggle competitions can evaluate their models without having full access to the data. This approach also takes inspiration from the trend 
in big data technology where moving data to a compute machine is computationally expensive. Instead, big data researchers move their 
portable compute models to the data to achieve their goals. Similarly, researchers in the network traffic classification domain can submit their 
classification models to the data owner and receive the results in return. 
 
6.4 Extending usage beyond browser-based applications  
 In this paper, we proposed Grano-GT which is a browser-based tool to build highly granular network traffic ground truth. Grano-GT 
focuses on browser-based applications because it takes advantage of the Chrome Devtools Protocol to intercept application signatures. This 
is possible because the interception occurs at the application layer of the OSI model, thus making the traffic visible with minimal encryption. 
However, Grano-GT holds a limitation where it is currently unable to collect network traffic ground truth beyond browser-based applications 
(e.g. desktop and mobile applications). This is because discriminating network traffic between different application services from a single 
application beyond the browser is challenging without the appropriate traffic visibility. 
  
 Maintaining traffic visibility beyond the browser is a long-standing challenge. One of the commonly used techniques to gain traffic 
visibility for building ground truth is socket monitoring. The majority of ground truth tools utilize socket monitoring in their design [2, 3, 8]. 
While it is a reliable technique to build network traffic ground truth at the application-name level, it presents a challenge to implement it at 
the application-service level. The challenge is due to applications using the same socket to communicate throughout the session, thus making 
it difficult to distinguish between application services. 
  
 Another feasible technique is tagging the target packets with a special flag for identification. Szabo et al. proposed a tool to build 
network ground truth by marking the target packets with the first two characters of the application name in the IP Router Alert option field 
[47]. Similarly, Lizhi et al. embedded the application information into the TOS field of the IP packets [2]. This is a viable technique but it 
requires proper consideration to avoid degrading the performance of the network due to the increased size of the packets and as such, 
extending Grano-GT beyond browser-based applications remains as future work. 
 
7.  CONCLUSION 
 This paper presents the design, development and experimental evaluation of Grano-GT. Grano-GT reinvents the way researchers build 
network traffic ground truth by focusing on building highly granular ground truth. Grano-GT achieves this objective by implementing a series 
of cascading filters. The final output of Grano-GT is a collection of traffic traces at the application-name and service levels. 
  
 Experimental tests demonstrate the effectiveness of Grano-GT. At the application-name level, Grano-GT guarantees optimum 
reliability due to the application isolator engine that filters the application traffic based on logged IP addresses. We validated this claim by 




Kolmogorov-Smirnov Test to evaluate the reliability of the traffic traces captured at the application-service level. The results showed that 
Grano-GT managed to build network traffic ground truth with reliability. Besides that, Grano-GT achieved higher granularity levels (i.e. 
application-name and service) if compared to prior works such as mentioned in Section 2 of this paper.  
  
 We are currently working to extend Grano-GT beyond browser-based applications which will allow Grano-GT to build network traffic 
ground truth for other desktop applications such as Skype, Telegram and desktop games and even mobile applications. We believe Grano-
GT can be useful for researchers to build their network traffic ground truth which is highly granular and reliable. 
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